Russia’s War against Ukraine affects International Cooperation in the Arctic
A New Cold War Emerges as the Age of Arctic Exceptionalism Ends
In reaction to Russia’s genocidal war against Ukraine, the seven Western Arctic States, i.e., Canada, the United States, Denmark (with regard to Greenland), Iceland, Norway, Sweden, and Finland, have suspended their cooperation with the Russian Federation in the Arctic Council (AC). Founded in 1996 on the basis of international cooperation on environmental matters in the Arctic, the Arctic Council is an international governance forum that has been an extraordinary success in the post-Cold War era. It brings together the eight Arctic states as well as half a dozen representative organizations of the indigenous peoples of the Arctic that enjoy a status almost at the same level as the states. The Arctic Council is not a classical international organization but a forum for international cooperation. The Arctic Council brought countries together despite political differences in order to address issues of common concern in the circumpolar north. Scientific work is at the core of the Arctic Council and this science inspires policies. Over the years, the Arctic Council has created invaluable knowledge resources and its work has culminated in the creation of three international treaties that had been negotiated under its auspices, on oil spills at sea, search and rescue operations, and scientific cooperation.
Since the escalation of Russia’s war against Ukraine and especially in light of the many war crimes committed by the forces loyal to the regime in Moscow, the A7 suspended cooperation with Russia within the Arctic Council in early March 2022. Until spring of next year, Russia holds the rotating presidency of the Arctic Council, and the A7 announced that they will not participate in meetings in Russia. A few days later, the Arctic Council announced that it would pause its work completely. Already at that time, the A7 emphasized what was called the “enduring value” of the Arctic Council. This phrase was also used in June 2022 when the A7 announced that they would resume some limited cooperation within the Arctic Council format. The emphasis here is on the limitations of this cooperation: while there is consensus among the A7 states that cooperation in the Arctic is important and that the work of the Arctic Council should be continued, there is also consensus that cooperation with Russia is not possible at this time. Earlier this month, the A7 announced that they would cooperate only on those issues that had been agreed upon at the Arctic Council’s 2021 meeting in Reykjavik, i.e., prior to Russia’s chairmanship, and in which Russia is not involved at all. This way, the Arctic Council might be preserved, but Russia would be excluded in practice. This approach is necessary because, like in the case of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Arctic Council’s founding document, the 1996 Ottawa Declaration, does not contain a clause that would allow for the exclusion of a member state. The Ottawa Declaration is a product of a more hopeful era, the culmination of a process of rapprochement and cooperation that had begun in the town of Rovaniemi, located at the Arctic Circle in Finland’s Lapland. This cooperation was based on shared concerns, slowly growing mutual trust, respect for scientific research, and for the indigenous peoples of the Arctic.
Today, these days seem long gone. Russia has repeatedly threatened Finland and Sweden, both of which have given up many years of neutrality and are seeking admission to NATO, as well as other member states of the European Union (EU), such as Estonia, Lithuania, and Poland. There remains a real risk that Russia will extend the war and attack NATO and EU countries directly or through hybrid attacks, such as the recent cyberattack against Lithuania that came in retaliation for Lithuania implementing EU sanctions and closing its territory for the transport of goods that may no longer be transported through EU territory to and from Russia. While some European leaders are still reluctant to risk further escalation, numerous war crimes and acts of genocide that are being committed against the people of Ukraine by Russian forces indicate that the risk of escalation is not determined in Brussels, Paris, Berlin, or Rome, but only in Moscow and Minsk. Only Russia and Belarus decide if and how they bring the war to other countries beyond Ukraine. Now, it is up to the West to defend the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Ukraine and of all European states.
The Arctic is now de facto split into two parts: Russia and the West. If Russia were to have a different, democratic, government, and if it would no longer pose a threat to its neighbours, it would be possible to resume cooperation - similar to the way things changed at the end of the First Cold War, when shared concerns about the Arctic brought former foes together. At the moment, though, it seems difficult to imagine this happening unless the West achieves a decisive victory against Russia in Ukraine and restores Ukraine’s territorial integrity.
There had long been the idea that the Arctic is somehow exceptional because the conflicts that mattered elsewhere were less important there. The same could be said about cooperation in Outer Space and in Antarctica. At the recent Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting in Germany, Russia was a regular participant, although the situation was openly described as problematic, as could be seen from the speech given by Germany’s state-secretary Jennifer Morgan when opening the meeting on 24 May 2022. With regard to cooperation on the International Space Station, Russia has already announced its intention to abandon humanity’s shared outpost in space. This comes at a time when China is making significant progress on its own Tiangong space station, with launches of two more modules planned for July and October 2022, and Russia might see the ability to disconnect the six remaining Russian modules from the ISS and to contribute to Tiangong as an opportunity to deal a blow to the West and to deepen ties with Beijing, especially as Russia’s economic dependency on China as a buyer of Russian hydrocarbons is growing at this time. In the Arctic, cooperation has become difficult because of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine.
If one looks at recent statements by Russian officials who have long been involved in Russia’s Arctic policy activities, including at the level of the Arctic Council, it might even be asked if there is a way back. Russian anti-Western propaganda and lies permeate even policy statements, not only with regard to the war but concerning the West in general. We have truly entered a Second Cold War and, like the First Cold War, it also affects the Arctic. This time, Sweden and Finland, EU members since 1995 and possibly soon NATO members, too, are no longer neutral. The lines are clearer and the stakes are higher than in the First Cold War.
While some politicians in the West do not even want to see the war against Ukraine as a proxy war between Russia and the West, it is already more than that: Russia is directly attacking a candidate for EU membership because the people of Ukraine, like the peoples of Georgia and Moldova, had turned away from Russia and chosen a European path for the future. This is an attack against Europe and Europe’s values. Securing peace and freedom requires stopping the aggressor. When genocide is committed against the civilian population of any country, neutrality is no longer an option. Finland and Sweden have understood this and have clarified their alignment with the West of which they have long been a part. It is time for politicians in Berlin and elsewhere to realize the same and to be clear to their constituents. This is not only about Russia and Ukraine, but it is also about the future of Europe and the defence of the freedom and democracy generations have been able to take for granted after Germany had been defeated in 1945. Many millions of Europeans have only enjoyed freedom and democracy for the last three decades and it is no surprise that the awareness that the protection of these core elements of our societies does not come for free is more pronounced there than elsewhere.
In the European Arctic, the Interbellum is over. Russia has started a Second Cold War and there is a very real risk of further escalation. The international cooperation between Russia and the West in the Arctic was one of the first bridges that were built when the First Cold War came to an end. Keeping the lights on at the Arctic Council, even without Russian participation, will be a way to secure continued cooperation at least in half of the Arctic. It will also make sure that there will be a structure in place to which a future, hypothetical, free and democratic Russia that will be at peace with its neighbours will be able to return. Now, though, is not the time to cooperate with Russia, but a time to stand united in the defence of the values that underpin also international cooperation in the Arctic: respect for an international order that is based on rules, the rule of law, and the protection of human rights, in particular the rights of minorities and indigenous peoples.
About the author
Prof. Dr. Stefan Kirchner is working at the intersection of international environmental law, human rights, and the law of the sea. In addition to practising law, he has taught international law at universities in Germany, Finland, Italy, Lithuania, Ukraine, and Greenland. His most recent books include “Security and Technology in Arctic Governance” (ed., 2022), “Governing the Crisis: Law, Human Rights and COVID-19” (ed., 2021), “El Ártico y su gente - Ensayos de derecho internacional” (2020), and “The Baltic Sea and the Law of the Sea - Finnish Perspectives” (with T. Koivurova, H. Ringbom and P. Kleemola-Juntunen, 2019). This text only reflects his personal opinion.